openclaw-skill/openclaw-knowhow-skill/docs/infrastructure/gateway/sandbox-vs-tool-policy-vs-elevated.md

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> Use this file to discover all available pages before exploring further.

# Sandbox vs Tool Policy vs Elevated

# Sandbox vs Tool Policy vs Elevated

OpenClaw has three related (but different) controls:

1. **Sandbox** (`agents.defaults.sandbox.*` / `agents.list[].sandbox.*`) decides **where tools run** (Docker vs host).
2. **Tool policy** (`tools.*`, `tools.sandbox.tools.*`, `agents.list[].tools.*`) decides **which tools are available/allowed**.
3. **Elevated** (`tools.elevated.*`, `agents.list[].tools.elevated.*`) is an **exec-only escape hatch** to run on the host when you’re sandboxed.

## Quick debug

Use the inspector to see what OpenClaw is *actually* doing:

```bash  theme={null}
openclaw sandbox explain
openclaw sandbox explain --session agent:main:main
openclaw sandbox explain --agent work
openclaw sandbox explain --json
```

It prints:

* effective sandbox mode/scope/workspace access
* whether the session is currently sandboxed (main vs non-main)
* effective sandbox tool allow/deny (and whether it came from agent/global/default)
* elevated gates and fix-it key paths

## Sandbox: where tools run

Sandboxing is controlled by `agents.defaults.sandbox.mode`:

* `"off"`: everything runs on the host.
* `"non-main"`: only non-main sessions are sandboxed (common “surprise” for groups/channels).
* `"all"`: everything is sandboxed.

See [Sandboxing](/gateway/sandboxing) for the full matrix (scope, workspace mounts, images).

### Bind mounts (security quick check)

* `docker.binds` *pierces* the sandbox filesystem: whatever you mount is visible inside the container with the mode you set (`:ro` or `:rw`).
* Default is read-write if you omit the mode; prefer `:ro` for source/secrets.
* `scope: "shared"` ignores per-agent binds (only global binds apply).
* Binding `/var/run/docker.sock` effectively hands host control to the sandbox; only do this intentionally.
* Workspace access (`workspaceAccess: "ro"`/`"rw"`) is independent of bind modes.

## Tool policy: which tools exist/are callable

Two layers matter:

* **Tool profile**: `tools.profile` and `agents.list[].tools.profile` (base allowlist)
* **Provider tool profile**: `tools.byProvider[provider].profile` and `agents.list[].tools.byProvider[provider].profile`
* **Global/per-agent tool policy**: `tools.allow`/`tools.deny` and `agents.list[].tools.allow`/`agents.list[].tools.deny`
* **Provider tool policy**: `tools.byProvider[provider].allow/deny` and `agents.list[].tools.byProvider[provider].allow/deny`
* **Sandbox tool policy** (only applies when sandboxed): `tools.sandbox.tools.allow`/`tools.sandbox.tools.deny` and `agents.list[].tools.sandbox.tools.*`

Rules of thumb:

* `deny` always wins.
* If `allow` is non-empty, everything else is treated as blocked.
* Tool policy is the hard stop: `/exec` cannot override a denied `exec` tool.
* `/exec` only changes session defaults for authorized senders; it does not grant tool access.
  Provider tool keys accept either `provider` (e.g. `google-antigravity`) or `provider/model` (e.g. `openai/gpt-5.2`).

### Tool groups (shorthands)

Tool policies (global, agent, sandbox) support `group:*` entries that expand to multiple tools:

```json5  theme={null}
{
  tools: {
    sandbox: {
      tools: {
        allow: ["group:runtime", "group:fs", "group:sessions", "group:memory"],
      },
    },
  },
}
```

Available groups:

* `group:runtime`: `exec`, `bash`, `process`
* `group:fs`: `read`, `write`, `edit`, `apply_patch`
* `group:sessions`: `sessions_list`, `sessions_history`, `sessions_send`, `sessions_spawn`, `session_status`
* `group:memory`: `memory_search`, `memory_get`
* `group:ui`: `browser`, `canvas`
* `group:automation`: `cron`, `gateway`
* `group:messaging`: `message`
* `group:nodes`: `nodes`
* `group:openclaw`: all built-in OpenClaw tools (excludes provider plugins)

## Elevated: exec-only “run on host”

Elevated does **not** grant extra tools; it only affects `exec`.

* If you’re sandboxed, `/elevated on` (or `exec` with `elevated: true`) runs on the host (approvals may still apply).
* Use `/elevated full` to skip exec approvals for the session.
* If you’re already running direct, elevated is effectively a no-op (still gated).
* Elevated is **not** skill-scoped and does **not** override tool allow/deny.
* `/exec` is separate from elevated. It only adjusts per-session exec defaults for authorized senders.

Gates:

* Enablement: `tools.elevated.enabled` (and optionally `agents.list[].tools.elevated.enabled`)
* Sender allowlists: `tools.elevated.allowFrom.<provider>` (and optionally `agents.list[].tools.elevated.allowFrom.<provider>`)

See [Elevated Mode](/tools/elevated).

## Common “sandbox jail” fixes

### “Tool X blocked by sandbox tool policy”

Fix-it keys (pick one):

* Disable sandbox: `agents.defaults.sandbox.mode=off` (or per-agent `agents.list[].sandbox.mode=off`)
* Allow the tool inside sandbox:
  * remove it from `tools.sandbox.tools.deny` (or per-agent `agents.list[].tools.sandbox.tools.deny`)
  * or add it to `tools.sandbox.tools.allow` (or per-agent allow)

### “I thought this was main, why is it sandboxed?”

In `"non-main"` mode, group/channel keys are *not* main. Use the main session key (shown by `sandbox explain`) or switch mode to `"off"`.